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Some two months since Ukrainians took to the streets, a political solution to the standoff between the EuroMaidan protestors and the 
Ukrainian authorities remains out of reach, with the situation on the ground remaining volatile. As the clock ticks there is fear that further 
violence and instability could be on the horizon. Further turmoil risks Ukraine’s territorial integrity, with talk of division and calls for Moscow to 
intervene coming from a number of Party of Regions speakers. It also increases the likelihood of new security threats going beyond Ukraine’s 
border including refugees and asylum seekers. Furthermore, as the political crisis deepens, Ukraine’s economic situation becomes more 
perilous with the chances of default on its debts rising. 
 
Unprecedented Violence 
 
Ukraine has a history of peaceful demonstrations and moderate politics. The violence against activists and ordinary people break with tradition 
and are a direct consequence of the aggressive methods employed by the state. Seven protestors have been killed, hundreds more injured. 
Some 22 people remain unaccounted for with kidnapping remaining a regular occurrence. Dmytro Bulatov leader of AutoMaidan, a 
movement within the EuroMaidan protesters, was found badly beaten, after he had vanished a week earlier. 
 
The violent acts carried out by the Ukrainian security forces, including "titushki” (hired thugs) and Berkut (elite riot police) towards protestors in 
Kyiv and the regions have been widely condemned. Unfortunately, not a single police officer or other security enforcement agent has been 
arrested despite the government promising a full investigation. However, the courts have systemically put activists in prison for up to sixty 
days. More recently the authorities switched to a more “selective” type of violence including burning protestor’s cars, carrying out “repression 
from the shadows” and clamping down further on free media and civil society. 
 
Yanukovych – bruised but not broken 
 
Ukrainian President, Viktor Yanukovych, miscalculated the reaction from the streets. While he is still surrounded by his inner circle, the Party 
of Regions is weaker with several MPs leaving and others signaling a readiness to support opposition bills in Ukraine’s Parliament. Yet he is 
far from ready to “throw in the towel”. He still has his local administrations network (although less powerful than before), the Berkut, support 
from key oligarchs who control large blocks of MPs and, of crucial importance, the backing of the Kremlin. The fact that the opposition remains 
rather weak also facilitates his political survival. 
 
While Yanukovych started to be slightly more flexible in talks with the opposition, following international pressure, this seems to be little more 
than a tactical step to play for time rather than a genuine desire to compromise. Hence his concessions have not been concessions at all. The 
abolishment of “dictatorship laws” which were adopted on 16 January, and which caused bloody clashes on Hrushevskoho Street, does not 
represent a concession given it should never have been adopted in the first place. Neither could the resignation of Prime Minister, Mykola 
Azarov. Rather he used these steps to buy time. When it comes to key demands such constitutional reform, electoral reform and a genuine 
amnesty bill, Yanukovych has been far from ready to concede. 
 
Stuck in deadlock 
 
As of mid-February there is a deadlock. The government does not have enough force to clear Maidan, while the opposition does not have 
enough power to mobilise the entire country. People are waiting with growing irritation and a feeling of betrayal. Russia is actively using its 
widespread networks, and leverage to influence the situation. It is impossible to predict which player may break the deadlock and where it 
may lead the country. Ultimately, the key question is whether there is any space for dialogue between the forces to find a political solution. 
 
Each player has a very different vision. Yanukovych would like to remain in power, receive financial (and other) support from Russia to 
maintain a “stable situation” until elections which he wants to win by whatever means he can. The opposition wants to achieve a compromise 
that has a clear road-map for change. This would begin with constitutional reform, then the creation of a technical government for a transitional 
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period, together with electoral reform. Maidan wants to reestablish the state with Georgia-type reforms, which would make police and courts 
subordinate to communities, remove corruption with a top-down approach, put EU integration back at the top foreign policy agenda and have 
Yanukovych and his “family” gone.  
 
For Russian President, Vladimir Putin, Ukraine is an indivisible part of Russia and the Eurasian Union project. The fact that Kyiv owes 
Moscow a substantial amount of money means that Moscow has significant leverage. However, it would be a mistake to believe that Russia 
is enamored with Yanukovych. In fact the Kremlin may dislike him as much as the West does. Their interest is to have somebody in power 
that will put in place a pro-Russian government and protect and promote Russian interests. 
 
It seems unlikely that Ukraine’s leadership wants civil war as this could sweep away the ruling elites, leaving behind a massive security 
vacuum, and a Ukraine broken into ‘pieces’. Therefore, Yanukovych will probably aim for a “bad peace”, and demonstrate a readiness to 
proceed with a number of reforms, but try to drag out the process of bringing them into force or do it in a way that will divide the opposition. 
This will particularly be the case with constitutional and electoral reform which will neuter his power. Constitutional reform limiting the 
President’s power is important but a fair electoral law is even more as without it, the road will remain open for Yanukovych to become Prime 
Minister once the Constitution is reformed. While Yanukovych can use any constitution to remain in power, only a free and fair electoral law, 
which has open party lists, can allow Ukrainians to bring the country back under their control. 
 
The role of the EU 
 
The EU must have a central role. The value of European integration for Ukraine is not only about reforms. It is first and foremost a mechanism 
to overcome regional divergences and offer a vision of a future state equally acceptable to all regions, thereby strengthening Ukrainian 
statehood. 
 
In order to break the deadlock, the EU and US have indicated they are ready to put on the table a substantial financial aid package, which 
also involves a number of other partners including the IMF, to support economic and political change. It seems this money would be attached 
to a clear roadmap of deep and systemic reforms. 
 
So far, despite the shuttle diplomacy and calls for political dialogue and comprise, the EU has been unable to influence Yanukovych to any 
great extent. This is partly because the EU has no clear strategy for Ukraine with divisions over how the EU should handle the crisis. One 
group, which is composed primarily of central and eastern Europe and the Baltics, are promoting a more robust response which goes beyond 
statements and calls for dialogue. A second group, which seems to include, Germany, France and the UK is more inclined to continue with a 
policy of waiting to see what Yanukovych – and Putin – do next. Unless there is substantial increase in violence and loss life, the majority of 
member states do not want to risk jeopardizing other interests, in particular relations with Russia. 
 
However, if there is no end to the kidnapping, and shadow repression, and no genuine effort from the Ukrainian authorities regarding 
concessions, or fully investigate the deaths and kidnapping of protestors, the EU needs to be ready to shift up a gear. Hence the threat of 
targeted sanctions, including travel restrictions and the freezing of the substantial assets of certain political elites and oligarchs in some 
member states, may be an incentive for peace. It is also important that the EU and other international actors such as the UN and US continue 
to regularly visit Ukraine, as this helps reduce the likelihood of new violence. 
 
Whichever new government eventually comes into power, Yanukovych‘s successors will inherit a very difficult situation which will test them 
from the moment they come in office. The EU needs to develop a long-term strategy for Ukraine. The recent statement by EU foreign 
ministers on 10 February, which says the Association Agreement does not constitute the final goal in EU-Ukraine co-operation, is a positive 
development, yet far from enough. While it seems the EU does not have much space to do more with the current government, they need to 
be prepared for the day after Yanukovych leaves power, and be well prepared to respond to Ukraine’s new realities. Furthermore, the EU also 
needs to use this opportunity to engage with Russia. While Moscow’s actions should not be tolerated at the same time its worries must not be 
ignored. Given that EU and Russian leaders have long been talking of a common European economic space, or as Russia’s leadership 
define it ‘Lisbon to Vladivostok,’ now would seem an opportune moment to elaborate this idea further. 
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